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Findings on Disarmament 
WILLIAM 0. PETERFI 
University of Minnesota, Morris 
ABSTRACT - The author proposes a critical appraisal of current disarmament plans and their im-
plications in present international affairs, especially, the 1964 draft treaties of the United States 
and the Soviet Union calling for a general and complete disarmament. By comparing and evalu-
ating these two plans, the author hopes to prove his thesis that although disarmament is part of 
the overall peace effort, the attainment of disarmament will not necessarily establish peace. On 
the contrary, before any actual and feasible disarmament can be achieved, there must be estab-
lished a peaceful international climate conducive to a general and complete disarmament. 
Part One 
"To disarm or not to disarm," is the question that 
might rightfully be asked by a latter day political scien-
tist-, military expert-, statesman-, or just common man-
turned Hamlet. Of course, the original question posed by 
the first Hamlet, "To be or not to be," is as relevant to-
day as it was in the Shakespearean drama. Moreover, to 
many people the two questions comprise the real issue 
regarding the future of mankind: "If you do not disarm 
you simply will not be." Others would develop this idea 
to its logical conclusion by saying that mankind will not 
survive unless peace is established throughout the world 
and to establish peace the nations must disarm. Thus, the 
argument goes, disarmament is an absolute prerequisite 
to peace; there can be no peace without disarmament. 
Whether or not this line of thinking is correct is discussed 
in this paper. 1 
The scope of disarmament can be divided into two dis-
The author holds the Doctor of Law and Political Science 
Degrees from Budapest University, 1950. Post-Doctoral Re-
search Fellow in International Politics, Yale University, I 958-59. 
Visiting Scholar in Politics, U.C.L.A., 1959-60. Visi ting Fellow-
in Politic.s, Princeton University, 1960-61. Between 1961-1965, 
he held teaching assignments at various colleges; since September 
1965, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University 
of Minnesota, Morris ; he is currently working on a book, entitled, 
Peace Without Disarmament. 
1 Because of the very extensive literature on disarmament, no 
attempt is made here to present even a limited bibliography. 
However, the present paper reflects, among others, the contribu-
tions of the following writers : Raymond Aron , Neville Brown, 
Richard A . Falk, Stanley Hoffman, Saul H. Mendlowitz, and 
Walter Millis (on war and war prevention); David Frisch, Ar-
thur Hadley, Morton H . Halperin, Louis Henkin, Thomas C . 
Schelling (on various aspects of Disarmament); and John W. 
Burton, Grenville Clark, Amitai Etzioni, and Louis B. Sohn ( on 
the prospects of peace). 
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tin ct categories: first, general and complete or compre-
hensive disarmament; and second, limited arms reduction 
or control. The first category would include disarmament 
agreements involving all nations and all types of arma-
ments; nations would be permitted only very limited arms 
for the maintenance of internal order by internal security 
forces. The other form of disarmament, limited in its 
scope, would consist of attempts at local agreements be-
tween two or more nations and would include only par-
tial armaments limitations. 
In a general and complete disarmament plan, which 
would be accomplished in various stages leading from 
less to more drastic and radical measures, all nations 
would adhere to a single treaty. General and complete 
disarmament is based on the assumption that there is an 
arms race which is general in its scope 2 among the pres-
ent international community of major and lesser nations. 
Thus, since nations do not live in isolation, a military 
build-up in one country stimulates similar measures 
among its neighbors, and even the neutra1 nations have 
no choice but constantly to improve their military pos-
ture, and, as a consequence, to be drawn involuntarily 
into the arms race. Since the neutral nations are not 
members of military alliances, national self-interest and 
survival is an individual concern . Most of the present 
neutral nations have forces well beyond the level suffi-
cient for the maintenance of internal peace and security. 
It follows from this argument, therefore, that any disarm-
ament argreement to which only a few states acceed, such 
0 Ao excellent introduction to the study of disarmament and 
arms control by Bull ( 1965), establishes a general terminology 
of the various meanings of disarmament and arms control, and 
offers a theoretical analysis of the subject matter. For practical 
purposes, Professor Bull's terminology is used in the present pa~ 
per. 
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as the various regional agreements, cannot stop the arms 
race; nor can disarmament agreements that are limited to 
only one category, such as nuclear weapons, naval, land, 
or air forces, for each state will attempt to protect its own 
national interest and security, and thus will embark upon 
a weapon increase in the other military areas. In other 
words, the agreed-upon limitations in one branch of arms 
will alter the direction but not the pace of the armament 
race (Bull, 1966: 271). 
On the other hand, those who argue in favor of limited 
arms control say that in the absence of an international 
climate conducive to general and complete disarmament, 
at least some limited reduction in arms should be intro-
duced and pursued. It is submitted that general and com-
plete disarmament under the present international condi-
tions would be too big a risk, not only for the smaller na-
tions but for the great powers as well. The lesser risk 
connected with a limited arms control and reduction, it 
is argued, would be more acceptable to all the nations of 
the world. The advocates of limited arms control then 
present a wide variety of proposals as first steps to a gen-
eral and complete disarmament: international control of 
atomic power; the reduction of conventional armaments 
and armed forces; the so-called "open skies" proposal 
for the prevention of surprise attack; the control of fis-
sionable material; and nuclear weapons testing control. 
During the some 130 meetings of the UN Disarma-
ment Subcommittee extending over the past years, several 
plans have been presented, discussed, and rejected by the 
various participating powers .3 Only one plan has been 
put into effect so far, the limited nuclear test ban treaty 
between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1963, 
since joined by some one hundred other nations. This 
treaty actually has no direct bearing upon disarmament 
because it does not limit nuclear weapons in any way; it 
only prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons and devices 
in outer space and under water. 
Part Two 
The history of the disarmament movement since the 
end of World War II can be divided into two periods; the 
first period between 1946-1959, resulting in a variety of 
limited arms control and reduction measures, and the 
second period since 1959, which is characterized by de-
mands for a general and complete disarmament (McVit-
ty, 1964: I ) . The shifting emphasis from arms-control 
measures to general and complete disarmament came in 
the wake of the great pressure exerted by the lesser pow-
ers in the United Nations because of the fear of nuclear 
proliferation, and culminated in a unanimous decision of 
the General Assembly of 1959 calling upon governments 
" Most of the disarmament plans have been submilted by the 
United States and the Soviet Union. In addition, Great Britain, 
France, and some of the unaligned powers contributed their own 
proposals. The People's Republic of China made public their 
plan for disarmament in 1963, well before their first nuclear 
explosion. Besides the plans submitted by various governments, 
there are also plans elaborated by private citizens and students 
of international affairs, the most notable of which is the Gren-
ville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, "Draft Treaty for Establishing 
World Disarmament" (Clark and Sohn, 1964). 
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to "make every effort to achieve a constructive solution 
of the problem of general and complete disarmament" 
(United Nations, 1964:37). It was during this second 
period that the so-called "Statement of Agreed Principles 
For Disarmament Negotiations" (the McCloy-Zorin 
Agreement of 1961) between the United States and the 
Soviet Union set forth some general guidelines for a com-
prehensive disarmament treaty.1 The establishment of 
these "general principles" was the result of the previous 
American and Russian limited disarmament and arms-
control plans. On the basis of the McCloy-Zorin agree-
ment, both countries proceeded to formulate their own 
draft treaties for general and complete disarmament. The 
first plans of 1962 have been continuously modified, and 
the latest proposals of 1964 form the basis of discussion 
in the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Subcommittee at 
the present. These two plans form the basis of my inves-
tigation of the whole complex problem of disarmament 
here. By comparing the two draft treaty proposals, I will 
attempt to unfold the basic issues and problems of a gen-
eral and complete disarmament. 
The justification of both the Russian and American 
plans is the assumption that " war is no longer an instru-
ment for settling international problems" (World Law 
Fund, 1965: 1 and 29). 3 To carry out their objectives, 
both plans call for an International Disarmament Organ-
ization (IDO) to work within the framework of the 
United Nations and to be responsible for the execution 
of the plans. The plans differ, however, on veto powers: 
The Soviet plan provides for a veto by any permanent 
member of the Security Council during the entire process 
of disarmament. On the other hand, the American plan 
would "ensure that the IDO and its inspectors would 
have unrestricted access without veto to all places as 
necessary for the purpose of effective verification" 
(World Law Fund, 1965: 30). To this issue I will return 
later. With regard to the time-table, the Russian proposal 
calls for completing the entire process of disarmament in 
a period of five years and in three different stages. The 
American proposal , on the other hand, while agreeing to 
a three-stage process does not have an overall timetable; 
it has time limits for the first two stages but none for the 
third , which would depend on the successful completion 
of Stages I and II. Thus, the Soviet plan favors rapid dis-
armament on the ground that it might eliminate a period 
during which violations of imbalances might occur be-
tween the participating nations whereas the American de-
1 These can be summarized in the following: (a) Disarma-
ment is general and complete and war is no longer an instru-
ment for settling international problems, and ( b) That such dis-
armament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable pro-
cedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective ar-
rangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations. On the basis 
of that the Statement calls for the elimination of armed forces, 
conventional and nuclear and proposes stages for the implemen-
tation under strict and effective international control. 
• The complete text of both the United States and the Soviet 
Union plans are in Current Disarmament Proposals as of March 
1, 1964, published by the World Law Fund, New York, 1965. 
Whenever reference is made to either plan, the text will be 
quoted from this source. 
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sire for slower progress would be a kind of built-in guar-
antee against possible violations. The Russian plan calls 
for an advance agreement to the total program and time-
table that would not allow a halt in the process by any 
nation claiming violation by others. The American plan, 
to be able to avoid difficulties during the process, advo-
cates the slow approach "by a sort of trial and error" 
(McVitty, 1964:4). 
Both plans agree on international inspection of the dis-
armament process through the IDO. However, the Soviet 
plan would exempt from inspection all permissible arma-
ments during the various stages. The American plan dif-
fers here from the Soviet counterpart insofar as it in-
cludes inspection of not only the armaments being re-
duced or abolished but those being retained during the 
various stages as well. 
The first stage under the Russian plan calls for the 
"simultaneous elimination of all means of delivering nu-
clear weapons and of all foreign military bases in alien 
territories," the reduction of armed forces , conventional 
armaments, production of arms, and military expendi-
tures ( World Law Fund, l 965: 5) ; only an agreed upon 
strictly limited number of nuclear weapons and intercon-
tinental missiles, and anti-missile missiles that are lo-
cated exclusively in their own territory would be retained 
by the United States and the Soviet Union until the end 
of the third stage. The American plan proposes a 30 per 
cent proportional cut in all types of weapons, both con-
ventional and nuclear. In the American concept this ap-
proach would provide a greater safeguard for verification 
of the disarmament process in its various stages than the 
Russian plan. 
In Stage II, the Russian plan calls for further decrease 
in the military personnel (from 1,900,000 to 1,000,000 
for each country) as well as in armaments and produc-
tion. In addition, "the states parties to the treaty shall 
undertake to effect the complete elimination of nuclear 
and other weapons of mass destruction" within 24 
months (World Law Fund, 1965: 15). The second stage 
under the American plan would begin "upon the transi-
tion from Stage I and would be completed within three 
years from that date" (World Law Fund, 1965: 46). An 
additional reduction of 50 per cent of all remaining 
armed forces and weapons after Stage I is proposed by 
the U.S. plan, which would also include similar measures 
for the production of armaments. With regard to nuclear 
weapons, the American plan provides that the parties to 
the treaty "would submit to the IDO a declaration stating 
the amounts, types and nature of utilization of all their 
fissionable materials" (World Law Fund, 1965: 49). 
These fissionable materials would then be reduced to 
"minimum levels on the basis of agreed percentage" 
( World Law Fund, 1965: 49). While the Soviet plan 
calls for the elimination of foreign bases in Stage I , the 
United States proposes the dismantling and conversion 
to "peaceful uses" of certain agreed military bases and 
facilities, only in Stage IL Finally, the U.S. plan would 
establish a United Nations Peace Force within the first 
year of Stage II, after verification of Stage I had success-
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fully been concluded. The Soviet plan provides for a 
similar establishment oniy during Stage III. Moreover, it 
actually would not be a separate force but would be 
made up from the so-called "police units" of the states 
that would be made available to the Security Council. On 
this issue there is again a great difference between the 
two proposals. The argument behind the U.S. approach 
is that there is no need for police force in Stage I because 
the nations would each retain enough power to defend 
themselves against any breach in the disarmament proc-
ess The U.S. proposal would begin to build up this po-
lice force during Stage II so that in Stage Ill it would 
emerge strong enough to possess "sufficient Armed 
forces and armaments so that no state could challenge 
it" (World Law Fund, 1965: 57). The Soviet proposal 
would build this police force on the basis of "national 
contingents" that would remain under the command of 
their respective military authorities. In Stage Ill, when 
they would be put at the disposal of the Security Council, 
the units' command would be "composed of representa-
tives of the three principal groups or states existing in 
the world on the basis of equal representation" (World 
Law Fund, 1965: 24-25). The use of a veto by any per-
manent member of the Security Council would obviously 
prevent the successful operation of this kind of UN 
Force as it is envisaged by the Soviet plan. 
Other features of Stage Ill of the Russian proposal 
are complete elimination of the remaining armed forces, 
conventional armaments, military production, military 
establishments, and military conscription and training, 
complete destruction of the nuclear weapons and means 
of delivery that had been provided for in Stage I. As a 
consequence, the nations would retain only the so-called 
police force (militia) equipped with light firearms on a 
proportional basis as prescribed in the treaty. 
The American Stage III is similar to the Soviet's with 
regard to the elimination of the remaining nuclear and 
conventional armaments, military personnel, and produc-
tion, but it also calls for the complete dismantling of the 
remaining military bases. 
On the important question of financing inspection and 
control by the IDO during the three stages, there seems 
to be no great difference between the two plans. It would 
be financed proportionately by all participating nations. 
The sole difference is that the Soviet plan calls for an ad-
vance assessment of the scale of payments by the nations 
whereas the American plan would allow the lDO nations 
to determine the scale. 
The amending process of the plans further illuminates 
the difference between them. According to the Russians, 
any amendment would require a two-thirds majority of 
the Conference, which is the larger body of the IDO 
comprising all states to the treaty and includes the perma-
nent members of the Security Council. The United States 
would leave determination of the amending process until 
after the treaty had come into force and when the parties 
"would agree to specific procedures for considering 
amendments or modifications of the treaty" (World Law 
Fund, 1965: 58). Throughout the various stages, the 
The Minnesota Academy of Science 
U.S. plan provides that any differences in the interpreta-
tion of their treaty proposal be subject to referral to the 
International Court of Justice. 
Part Three 
Both plans, it appears, leave unsolved three major 
problems, all of which must be solved if disarmament is 
to be a success: first, the difficulty of having all nations 
acceed voluntarily to a disarmament plan; second, the 
lack of a necessary guarantee of security to all nations 
during the various stages of actual disarmament; and, 
third, the overall problem of the nature of a disarmed 
and warless world. On all three of these issues, neither 
plan offers convincing and satisfactory approaches and 
guarantees. 0 
Both disarmament proposals provide for a mechanism, 
the International Disarmament Organization (IDO), that 
would become a part of the United Nations, and would 
include as its members all the participating nations. In 
the Russian plan, this membership feature is necessary 
because the treaty, before going into effect, must be 
agreed upon and ratified by all participants. In the Amer-
ican plan, membership would become a requirement only 
in Stage II and could not be undertaken until " all mili-
tarily significant states had become parties to the treaty" 
(World Law Fund, 1965: 29) .7 
Of course, not all nations of the world are presently 
members of the United Nations, and this fact alone sug-
gests the enormity of the first problem. Since, according 
to both plans the principles of the UN Charter would be 
applicable, those nations denied membership will not be 
wiiling to adhere to any disarmament plan unless admit-
ted to UN membership and allowed to participate in the 
preparation of the final draft. Consequently, a draft treaty 
prepared and adopted by all present member nations of 
the UN would have to be modified to be acceptable to 
those nations which are not members.' The provisions of 
the present draft treaties inviting all nations to join will 
probably be unsatisfactory to those which have had no 
influence in preparing it. Thus, the first step in disarma-
ment should start with the reorganization of the present 
United Nations." All the nations of the world should be 
• Marion McVitty reached similar conclusions in her evalua-
tion of the two plans by proclaiming that " the disparity between 
the two official disarmament plans is less important than the 
mutual fail ure of the two governments to complete them" (Mc-
Vitty, 1965: 40). What makes both plans unacceptable and un-
workable is basically the lack of provisions for the definiteness 
of the state of affairs in the international community of nations 
in a so-called "disarmed and warless world ." 
'Neither plan identifies what is meant by "militaril y signi fi -
cant states." 
• Hedley Bull objects to the present bilateral approach of dis-
armament negotiations and proposals between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. He argues that if, for example, France 
and The People's Republic of China would participate in dis-
armament discussions it would perhaps be easier to achieve 
progress ( Bull, I 965: xxxviii-xxxix). 
'John W. Burton in his Peace Th eory-Preconditions of Dis-
annmmmt, questions the whole concept of the UN, by proclaim-
ing that the Charter "does not reflec t the concept of peace," be-
cause it proposes the el imination of war through the peaceful 
settlements of disputes and provides collective action against 
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admitted to UN membership. The problems of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China and the divided nations of Ger-
many, Korea, and Vietnam should be settled. 1u Clearly, 
any disarmament plan would present unsurmountable 
ditnculties if these nations did not participate in the prep-
aration of it. Under both of the present plans, the 1DO 
will be responsible for the execution of the disarmament 
process. Thus, all nations participating in disarmament 
will have to become members of it. The IDO is supposed 
to be put under the control of the United Nations and if 
states presently non-members of the UN would join in 
general and complete disarmament, a conflict of interest 
might very well arise out of the membership in the 1DO 
and non-membership in the UN. 
Another problem arises out of the absolute control 
through the veto power, of the Permanent Members of 
the present Security Council. It is very likely that unless 
this veto power is abolished, the middle and lesser pow-
ers of the world will be reluctant to trust their future to 
the good will of the super-powers. The American sugges-
tion of a two-thirds majority rule in all stages of the dis-
armament process would more likely be acceptable to 
these powers, Also, the U.S. proposal for the settlement 
of disputes by the International Court of Justice would 
increase the feeling of security of the lesser participating 
powers. But the vagueness in design and the basic differ-
ences in approach in the two plans with regard to admis-
sion of states to the IDO makes both plans totally inade-
quate even before actual disarmament could be at-
tempted. 
Now, even assuming that the membership and veto 
problems have been eliminated by a more realistic ap-
proach acceptable to the United States and the Soviet 
Union, there still remains a second problem, the super-
vision of the various Stages and the guarantees against 
possible violators. Perhaps one of the greatest problems 
of any disarmament plan will be the question of the de-
tection of violations and the punishment of violators at 
any given step of disarmament. 11 Both plans agree on 
strict inspection and "enforcement" of the entire disarm-
ament process; nevertheless, the ways and means of de-
tecting a violation and determining punishment differ so 
profoundly as to make both systems wholly unworkable_ 
aggression, "both of which presuppose as inevitable a state of 
circumstances in which there cannot be a condition of peace." 
Burton, I 962: 131. 
Among the many critics of the United Nations advocating a 
general reorganization of the UN, the contributions of Clark and 
Sohn are outstanding. The importance of the reorganization of 
the United Nations and the inclusion of all nat ions which are 
presently outside of the UN is being proposed as a first step 
in the establishment of peaceful international cooperation among 
nations by Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn in their major 
work: World Peace Through World Law. 
10 A short, very thought fu l, analysis of the implications of 
China, especially since her nuclea r capability, is found in Ar-
thur S. LaJl's article, "The Political Effects of the Chinese Bomb," 
in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 1965: 21-24. 
The general aspects of China in contemporary world affa irs are 
discussed by Morton Halperin in his China and th e Bomb. 
11 A profound analysis of the problem of control is presented 
in the standard study on Strategy and Arms Control, by Thomas 
C. Schelli ng and Morton Halperin. 
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If any nation would succeed in evading the fulfillment of 
any part of disarmament, this could lead to the over-
throw of the existing balance between the nations. As 
Arthur T . Hadley pointed out: 
Since the critical function of arms control is first to 
stabilize the balance of terror and then to reduce 
the elements in the balance itse lf, current arms con-
trol and disarmament proposals can be examined to 
see whether they contribute to this goal. The ques-
tion is not, Does an arms control plan effectively 
"disarm" a nation? but, Does it make all-out war less 
likely, or reduce the destructiveness of any war that 
might occur? If it does not, or if it leaves the situation 
basically unchanged , the plan is neither in the nation-
al nor in the world interest. ( Hadley, 1965: 72) 
As mentioned above, according to the U.S. plan any de-
tected violation would bring that particular stage to a 
complete halt while the violation remains uncorrected. 
It appears that under the U.S. plan, the only means for 
the correction of a deliberate violation would be the 
force of world opinion. In the Russian plan, depending 
upon the nature of the violation and the sta,te involved, 
action could be taken or prevented by the use of the ve-
to. Thus, the abrogation of the draft treaty at any stage 
by any major nation would probably stop the disarma-
ment process and lead to a renewal of the arms race. 
A common feature of both disarmament proposals is 
the very vague and negative character of the so-called 
disarmed and warless world. If the Soviet draft treaty is 
carried out, no nation would be able to wage war and the 
relations among nations would be completely controlled 
by the United Nations. However, the plan does not pro-
vide any concrete means for the solution of international 
disputes which might arise after the attainment of general 
and complete disarmament. War, as a means of national 
policy, would be outlawed and all disputes would have 
to be settled peacefully in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations. A police force, established by the 
IDO and controlled by the Security Council, would main-
tain international peace and security. However, the Rus-
sian concept of international police force, based upon the 
national police forces (militia) and controlled by the 
three groups of nations, the East, the West, and the Un-
aligned Bloc, would obviously render this 1D0 force 
inoperative. The international police force proposed by 
the United States docs not seem much better in this re-
spect. The U.S. draft treaty calls for an independent in-
ternational police force under the United Nations which 
would have real power after the completion of disarma-
ment. This force could be used any time whenever the 
United Nations members and the Security Council so de-
cide. However, as long as the veto remains, its use would 
be very limited, if not impossible indeed. 
The peaceful settlement of international disputes in a 
disarmed world would remain unsolved (Hedley, 1961: 
73-77) . It appears that the conduct of international af-
fairs would in a way be built upon a "balance of national 
power" rather than based upon "enforceable world law" 
(McVitty, 1965: 34). Both plans would thus continue 
the old pre-disarmament international system of the bal-
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ance of power, mutual deterrence, and sovereignty of na-
tions. If there is no basic change in the international sys-
tem, the states will have no reasons to change their atti-
tudes toward it either. In the absence of a definite and 
workable new system the compliance of nations to the 
new requirement will rest on the old proven principles of 
national self-determination and self help. It appears to 
me that both the United States and the Soviet Union are 
in a way proposing old cures to old maladies (Millis and 
Real , 1963: 195-196). However, a word of caution is 
due here, especially with regard to the Soviet proposal. 
Speaking of the Russian approach to the security of na-
tions in a disarmed world, a Soviet expert, G. Andreyev, 
writing in the Moscow published International Affairs, 
offers the following assurances to all nations: 
The very principle of settling the disarmament issue 
precludes (italics mine) the possibility of advantages 
and privileges to anyone. Once all states disarm, 
once not a single state has a war machine at its 
disposal, this will preclude any possibility of threaten-
ing the security of any state or group of states (An-
dreyev, 1961, 6: 7). 
In the defense of their plan, the Soviets spare no ef-
forts in letting the world know that "to abolish war and 
establish everlasting peace on earth is a historic mission 
of Communism" (lnozemtsev, 1961, 11: 15) . As a mat-
ter of a fact, another Soviet writer, in accordance with 
the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, gives a very simplified 
analysis of the causes of war and the reasons leading to 
peace: 
The only source of a war threat today is imperial-
ism. The states of the Socialist communi ty, the 
peoples of the neutralist countries and the working 
people in the imperialist states themselves strive to 
counteract the latter's inherent tendency to give rise 
to wars. The balance between the forces of war and 
of peace now makes it very difficult to start a world 
war and decreases the probability of other types of 
wars being launched . As imperialism becomes weak-
er and the influence of tbe world Socialist system 
on international relations increases, the possibility 
of armed outbreaks occurring will steadily decrease. 
This makes the task of excluding world war from so-
ciety a feasible one even before the complete victory 
of Socialism has been achieved and despite the pres-
ervation of capitalism in part of the world. With the 
victory of Socialism all over the world , the social 
and national reasons for starting wars of any type 
will finally be eliminated (Galkin, 1961, 11: 29). 
If this above statement has any bearing upon the ques-
tion of disarmament, it is its conclusion which clearly 
contradicts the Soviet plan for general and complete 
disarmament in admitting that wars will actually not end 
after disarmament but only after the victory of Socialism 
"all over the world. " But if that is the Soviet belief then 
disarmament, at least from the point of view of the non-
Socialist countries becomes remote indeed. The ideo-
logical differences between the West and East appear to 
be too wide to dispel the basic mistrust between the two 
groups of nations. 
In conclusion, then, the reasons why the present U.S. 
The Minnesota Academy of Science 
and USSR disarmament proposals are inadequate to 
achieve their proposed goal might be summarized as fol-
lows. First of all, because of the ideological split among 
them the present division among nations would not dis-
appear in a disarmed world. The Soviet system of dis-
armament takes full cognizance of this fact by providing 
equal joint control of the international police force by 
the Unaligned, the Western and the Eastern bloc of na-
tions. In this regard, the Russian concept is much more 
realistic than the American plan, which does not want to 
recognize such basic divisions of the world. But these 
very divisions preclude a workable agreement. Thus, as 
a first pre-disarmament move, the creation of an interna-
tional climate conducive to disarmament is essential. The 
present pending issues, such as the German Peace Treaty, 
the divided nations, the reorganization of the United Na-
tions, the admission of all nations to the UN, the veto in 
the Security Council, nuclear testing, the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, overpopulation, economic aid to under-
developed nations, technological sharing and the oppos-
ing military alliances in the world must be solved before 
any serious attempt at disarmament can be made. The 
present concepts of the nations-state system, sovereignty, 
and national self-determination of nations, must be reap-
praised and the rule of law in international relations es-
tablished. 
In the final analysis peaceful cooperation among na-
tions can be established only if the nations really want to 
disarm and live in peace with each other. If the Soviet 
Union and the United States cannot reach an agreement 
on the admission of the People's Republic of China now, 
if they are not capable nor willing to agree on a peace 
treaty with Germany, it seems absurd to envision the 
feasibility of an even more difficult general and complete 
disarmament and peaceful cooperation among nations 
afterwards. 
As the two mightiest nations of the world, the United 
States and the Soviet Union should take the lead in the 
establishment of a world without fear and suspicion. If 
these two nations could eliminate the presently existing 
mistrust towards each other and propose feasible solu-
tions of the outstanding issues of international politics, 
the confidence of the lesser nations in their leadership 
and sincerity could become a most valuable down-pay-
ment to an eventual general and complete disarmament. 
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